

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. BUNN (United States of America)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Burma:

U CHIT MYAING
U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. R. KLEIN
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCIOLI
Mr. G.P. TCZZOLI
Mr. R. BERLENGHI

Mexico:

Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK
Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. V. TARZIORU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. A.R. ELREEDY
Mr. Y. RIZK

United Kingdom:

The Rt.Hon. F. MULLEY
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. N.C.R. WILLIAMS

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
Mr. C.G. BREAM
Mr. W. GIVAN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the 392nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. HUSAIN (India): I should like today to state briefly the views of the delegation of India on certain proposals which have been made in the Committee with regard to chemical and bacteriological weapons.

3. In my statement of 13 August I reiterated the full support of the Government of India for the total prohibition of the use of these weapons of mass destruction and the need for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the accession thereto of those States which had not adhered. As a declaratory prohibition we believe in the continuing importance and validity of the Protocol regardless of the passage of time or of some of the doubts which have been expressed here about the absence of certain provisions or about the phraseology used in the Protocol. I concluded by saying:

"However, in view of recent developments and the issues raised here by various delegations, the whole subject needs to be carried a step beyond the position as it is today, but without detriment to the validity and importance of the Protocol." (ENDC/PV.389, para.19)

4. As regards the proposals which have been made in the Committee, the representative of the United Kingdom has suggested that the Secretary-General of the United Nations be requested--

"...to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use, with a view to giving this Committee an international scientific basis for future consideration of further measures for their limitation and control, as well as focusing public opinion on the issues involved" (ENDC/PV.381, para.92)

The representative of Poland has, however, suggested that the scope of the proposed study should be widened so as to include the effects of the use of both chemical and bacteriological weapons (ENDC/PV.385, para.70). In his comment on these proposals the representative of the United States said:

"On balance, we see some net gain in treating chemical weapons separately from bacteriological weapons. However, we can support a study on the nature and possible effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons, either together or separately." (ENDC/PV.389, para.112)

(Mr. Husain, India)

The representative of the Soviet Union in the course of his remarks stated that the Soviet Union--

"...supports the idea advanced by the delegation of the Polish People's Republic concerning the preparation of a report on the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons." (ENDC/PV.390, para.92)

5. A number of other delegations have also expressed themselves in favour of a study by the Secretary-General of the nature and effects of the possible use of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. That is understandable because of the valuable precedent of the study prepared by the Secretary-General, with the help of experts, on the nature and possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons. The report (A/6858) on that study underlined the perils of the nuclear arms race and the need for the immediate cessation of that race and the elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the countries possessing them. A similar study would further strengthen the prohibition enjoined in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and provide the background for banning the production and stockpiling of such weapons and for their complete elimination.

6. The delegation of India is of the view that the time has come when such a study should be undertaken without delay. The study should cover both chemical and bacteriological weapons, because both types of weapons are equally evil and, as already mentioned, there are categories in which it becomes difficult to distinguish one from the other. It is necessary that the international community be made aware of the nature and possible effects of the use of these weapons of mass destruction, with particular reference to those States which are not in a position to establish for themselves any comprehensive means of protection. However, since different experts would have to study each of the two types of weapons, the Secretary-General might need to appoint two different groups of qualified consultant experts. Instead of one study there would need to be two studies, or a study in two parts, which would have to be simultaneously prepared and submitted by the Secretary-General. It is only after such studies are available that we can consider what further action should be taken.

7. I should, however, before concluding, like to stress that our support for these studies rests on our basic position of a total prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and our strong support for the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which forbids such use.

8. Mr. BURNS (Canada): Today I should like to express the views of the Canadian delegation concerning the proposal by the Soviet Union for a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. At our meeting of 1 August the representative of the Soviet Union said:

"We must deal with this problem by virtue of the United Nations General Assembly recommendation. The Assembly, which considered this question on the initiative of the Soviet Union at its twenty-second session, expressed in resolution 2289--

'... its conviction that it is essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention'. (ENDC/PV.386, para.40)

9. The Canadian delegation feels that, in view of the above-cited resolution, (ENDC/210) those delegations here which desire to do so should have an opportunity to express their views on the usefulness or otherwise of pursuing discussions on this matter. It will not surprise anyone that the Canadian delegation does not consider that a convention calling for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would have the good results that its proponents claim for it.

10. Our position was stated during the debate in the First Committee on the draft resolution which became General Assembly resolution 2239 (XXII). The Canadian representative said on 23 November:

"As was pointed out by the Canadian representative in the debate on a similar item in this Committee six years ago, the Canadian delegation has every sympathy with the views of those delegations which have over the years supported resolutions whose aim was to put an end to the possibility of nuclear weapons of mass destruction being used in time of war. We agree with their sentiments and respect their concern that the peoples of the world should not be subject to the death and destruction which the use of such weapons would cause. That is an aim which all Canadians profoundly share. While agreeing that the question is important, we have differed with supporters of those resolutions, not on the goal to be attained, but rather on the best and most effective means to be used in achieving that goal.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"The Soviet Union states that the adoption of a clear decision by the General Assembly in favour of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons will serve peace and relax international tension. For our part, we seriously question the value of such a convention. The Canadian delegation certainly favours the cause of peace and the relaxation of international tension, and nuclear arms control. We do not believe, however, that a declaratory prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons is the most effective way of securing world peace. Such an agreement, if accepted, would leave untouched the present large stocks of nuclear weapons maintained by the military nuclear Powers and would not represent a step towards the reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons or towards disarmament. On various occasions in the past, Soviet representatives have rejected Western proposals on the grounds that they did not constitute progress towards disarmament. But history shows that a declaratory measure such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact was conspicuously unsuccessful in preventing war. In the long term, peace and security are more surely secured through agreements on nuclear arms control, such as the partial Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, which can be effectively verified by the parties to them. An essential feature of all such measures is the willing support of the two most powerful nuclear countries in the world today -- the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." (A/C.1/PV.1537, provisional, pp.42-43)

11. At the same session of the General Assembly, in explanation of our abstention in the vote on the draft resolution, we made the further comment on this proposal at the meeting of the First Committee on 4 December:

"...in discussions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, as well as in this Committee, many delegations voiced the opinion that States which are not nuclear Powers and which are expected to pledge themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons should be given an assurance that the nuclear Powers will not use nuclear weapons against them.

"The Canadian delegation has much sympathy with that argument. An assurance such as that sought by many non-nuclear States might be considered ... as a partial prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and hence as being related to the subject of the resolution just voted upon." (A/C.1/PV.1541, provisional, pp.38-40 and 41)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

12. It seems to my delegation that it would be practical to look at the question of declarations not to use nuclear weapons in two different aspects. The first of these aspects, I suggest, should be declarations of the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-aligned non-nuclear States. In that connexion all representatives will of course have in mind Security Council resolution 255 (1963) of 19 June last, which, in operative paragraph 2 --

"Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;" (ENDC/226)

The States which expressed that intention were, of course, the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom.

13. The Canadian delegation feels that everyone who reflects on the matter will recognize that a promise to assist any State which is the victim of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used is tantamount to a promise that the nuclear Power will not itself use its nuclear weapons, or threaten to use them, against non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty. It seems to the Canadian delegation that this solemn resolution of the Security Council worked out in careful negotiations between the three nuclear Powers mentioned, would afford just as good an assurance of security against nuclear attack to non-nuclear States parties to the treaty as would a general convention promising all the countries in the world that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. In fact, it is probably a better guarantee, because by and large it is easier to live up to an agreement of fairly specific intent than to one of very general intent.

14. Another way in which security against nuclear attack has been assured to a specific group of non-nuclear nations is through Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty -- that is, the Latin-American nuclear-free zone Treaty. The essential article in that Protocol is the following:

"The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America."
(ENDC/186, p.32, Additional Protocol II, article 3).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That protocol has been signed by the United Kingdom and by the United States.

In signing the protocol the United States Government clarified its interpretation of the undertaking with the following statement:

"As regards the undertaking in article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a contracting party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the contracting party's corresponding obligations under article 1 of the Treaty."

The Canadian delegation understands that both France and the USSR are also considering their positions with respect to the protocol.

15. The Canadian delegation feels that, if the African States belonging to the Organization of African Unity could get together and complete their project for a treaty making Africa a nuclear-free zone, on the lines of the Tlatelolco Treaty, they could receive a guarantee equivalent to those in Additional Protocol II which I have quoted. The delegations here will recall that the question of a nuclear-free zone for Africa was taken up in several sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and on 3 December 1965 resolution 2033 (XX) was adopted by 105 votes in favour to none against, with three abstentions (ENDC/162). That resolution endorsed the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued by the assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 1964, and expressed the hope that the African States would initiate studies with a view to implementing the denuclearization of Africa, and take the necessary measures through the Organization of African Unity to achieve that end (operative paragraphs 2 and 7). For various reasons no progress has been made on that desirable project; but one hopes that after the considerable debate that has been stirred up by the non-proliferation treaty on the question of security assurances, (ENDC/226) and also with the notable example of the Tlatelolco Treaty, work on the project will be revived.

16. I have just cited two kinds of undertakings by nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-aligned nations not possessing nuclear weapons. It is open to other non-nuclear nations not enjoying the protection of such undertakings to achieve

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

that protection by signing and ratifying the non-proliferation treaty, or by setting up nuclear-free zones on the lines which Latin America has pioneered. I think it is realistic to say that the nuclear Powers were able to make the declarations they made because they did not foresee any circumstances in which they would need to use nuclear weapons in their own defence in any international dispute with non-aligned nations not having nuclear weapons.

17. But when we consider the relations between members of alliances which include a nuclear Power, we see that circumstances are very different. An undertaking not to use nuclear weapons in that case would have far more implications -- and I think, far less credibility -- than an undertaking between nuclear Powers and non-aligned States which are unarmed from the nuclear point of view. There are many political and moral reasons which have prevented the nations in one alliance or another from resorting to armed force to settle controversies between them; although there have been many situations which in a non-nuclear age might well have led to an outbreak of hostilities. But it is generally admitted that the strongest reason is that, if any acts of war should occur, there would be a strong possibility that, although begun with conventional armaments, these would soon escalate into a nuclear war whose scope and results no one could calculate. What is certain is that, if the full power of the nuclear armament of both sides were brought into action, such death and destruction would be wrought that no possible political purpose could be worth the risk involved in resorting to the use of military force to attain it.

18. Let us consider the implications of the word "prohibition" in connexion with the proposed convention. When any act is to be prohibited in ordinary national law, there is always some sanction that will be applied if the prohibition is broken -- a fine, imprisonment or some other penalty --; but in international affairs there is no one above the great Powers to enforce obedience to the terms of a convention or treaty by imposing penalties. If nations have mutually agreed not to do certain things, the sanction consists in the possibility of retaliation. In the case of the non-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear Power "A" would be restrained from breaching the convention by the fear that if it did it would bring on the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear Power "B"; in short, it would be restrained by the same sanction against acts of war as exists in the present circumstances. And that condition would continue so long as the nuclear Powers on both sides retained their nuclear armament.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

19. Would the signature of a convention on non-use really give more assurance that nuclear weapons would not be used than the existing recognition that their use could mean immeasurable death and destruction? Would all nations believe that the nuclear Powers would never, in any circumstances, use nuclear weapons, while they retained all their nuclear armaments and continued to add to them and improve their death-dealing capability? If that would not be believed, then should the great nations set their signatures to a document which embodies lofty aspirations -- as the Briand-Kellogg Pact did -- but which is subject, in the interpretation which the signatories place upon it, to the usual principle applying to all treaties, rebus sic stantibus? We can easily imagine changes in the conditions under which such a treaty would be negotiated; and if all conditions did not remain the same, some signatories would regard the treaty as no longer binding.

20. The key to belief in any promise not to use nuclear weapons is for the nuclear Powers to stop increasing their stocks and developing new weapons, and then to begin reduction. Unless and until much progress has been made in mutual reductions of conventional forces, and also in halting the nuclear arms race and reducing the arsenals on either side, it would not seem possible for the nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to renounce the possibility of defensive use of nuclear weapons. It would be easy to cite from history -- some of it quite recent -- examples of the important influence that capabilities have had on intentions.

21. The Canadian delegation fears that to make the convention proposed by the Soviet Union the first object of disarmament negotiations at the present time would result in diverting the pressure of world opinion on the nuclear Powers to first halt the arms race, then begin to reduce, and finally to eliminate their nuclear armament. Deeds, not words, are what the world wants; not a paper convention but a real scrapping of nuclear weapons and their vehicles.

22. The news we heard recently that the great nuclear Powers are prepared to meet to negotiate on a halt to the arms race and the subsequent reduction of nuclear armament is the best we have heard on the disarmament front -- if I may use that expression -- for many years. I am sure that other delegations here, like the Canadian delegation, are hoping that before long there will be news that those meetings can take place.

23. Mr. CARACCIOLI (Italy) (translation from French): Today I should like to state the position of the Italian delegation towards the problem of underground nuclear explosions. I shall endeavour to be brief, because I have no ambition to make a scientific exposition but wish to put forward some suggestions based on common sense in order to achieve concrete progress, at least on one of the specific measures of disarmament.

24. After the debate which has taken place during the past few weeks, there is no doubt whatsoever that the prohibition of all tests for military purposes has been fully supported by the great majority of the delegations represented here. In the agenda presented by the co-Chairmen which the Committee approved at its meeting on 15 August (ENDC/PV.390, para. 121), that problem appears under the first heading of measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Indeed, it is mentioned among the first measures to be discussed during our forthcoming negotiations.

25. While it is true that the desire to enter urgently into negotiations on an agreement on underground tests has been clearly manifested, it is equally true that the discussion in this Committee has revealed the existence of genuine obstacles to the rapid conclusion of an agreement strictly prohibiting nuclear tests for military purposes in all environments. It seems to me, therefore, that certain conclusions could be drawn from the debates that have taken place on this subject.

26. First of all, it has become clear that the problem of verification remains the principal difficulty to be overcome. Several delegations, including those of Sweden (ENDC/PV.385) and Canada (ENDC/PV.389), have informed us of the progress achieved recently in the identification of seismic phenomena. Basing himself both upon logic and upon valid scientific data, the representative of Canada argued that international co-operation was a factor likely to promote decisive progress in the control of underground tests. In that connexion he stated on 13 August:

"The prospects for such results would be greatly enhanced, in our view, by an increase in international co-operation and exchange of data. This is in keeping with our long-standing interest and participation in the 'seismic detection club'. In our view, the establishment of a world-wide interlocking network of seismological stations and an international data exchange centre would pay enormous dividends in terms of both pure science and test-ban control." (ibid., para.33)

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

27. A second element which has been highlighted in the discussions is the widely-shared opinion concerning the need to show political good will and to have an open mind on intermediate solutions, so that concrete results may be attained. That is why the ideas put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom and contained in its delegation's working paper of 20 August (ENDC/232) seem to us to deserve our closest attention and to call for subsequent elaboration.

28. A third element has emerged from our discussions - namely, the unquestionable link which exists between the negotiations concerning strategic nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and the cessation of underground explosions for military purposes. In that connexion the Italian delegation believes that a positive conclusion of the negotiations on the limitation of missiles could undoubtedly favour the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of underground tests; although this link must not be interpreted as a sufficient motive for delaying our work, which is aimed at finding overall or partial solutions to the problems to which I have referred.

29. In view of these considerations, my delegation would today like to put forward the specific suggestion to separate the settlement of the problem of underground explosions for peaceful purposes from that of the problem of strictly military tests. This separation would have the advantage of making it possible to devise an acceptable formula for verification, leaving aside for the moment the sector of explosions for military purposes. The problem would thereby be greatly simplified; for this approach would give us the opportunity of seeking a temporary solution, pending advances in science and technology that will give us the means of guaranteeing, beyond all possible dispute, an overall prohibition. Under an international system for regulating nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, certain preliminary initiatives could thus, in our opinion, be envisaged.

30. In the first place, all peaceful nuclear explosions should be notified to the United Nations. In their communications the governments concerned should furnish all relevant information, such as the approximate date of the explosion, its location, its depth, its purposes and its power. All explosions not notified to the United Nations would be considered to be tests for military purposes.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

31. Secondly, governments desiring to carry out explosions for peaceful purposes would be obliged to allow a certain number of designated experts from non-nuclear countries to attend those tests. Scientists as well as technicians of the non-nuclear Powers would have the opportunity of familiarizing themselves with the techniques of nuclear explosions and, especially, of becoming acquainted with their practical results. Thus a start would be made to apply the provisions of article V of the non-proliferation treaty.

32. Thirdly, the governments of the non-nuclear countries would submit a list of experts from which the governments of the countries where the nuclear explosions were to take place could choose the observers to invite.

33. I wish to make it clear that the sole object of the suggestions I have just made is to facilitate a final agreement through the adoption of measures that are partial but in the present circumstances feasible.

34. With the same object, the Italian Government considers that it might also be possible to reach an agreement on the timeliness of a joint formal declaration prohibiting all explosions for military purposes under the sea-bed. On the other hand, explosions for peaceful purposes in the same environment could be made the subject of a general moratorium pending the establishment of international regulations safeguarding the interests of all nations.

35. My delegation intends to have circulated in the next few days a working paper embodying the ideas I have just put forward, for later examination by the Committee and for inclusion, as an Italian document,^{1/} in the final report of the Committee to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

36. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): It is not my intention to make a formal statement today. However, since we are nearing the conclusion of the work of our present session I feel I should follow up the interesting and constructive remarks made this morning by the representative of India, Mr. Husain, with some brief observations on the discussion in the Committee on chemical and biological warfare.

37. At the outset I should like to express the appreciation of my Government to all those members of the Committee who have participated in this discussion and expressed support for our view of the importance of this subject, following my introduction of

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

the question on behalf of my Government at the first meeting of this session on 16 July (ENDC/PV.381, paras. 87 et seq.) As I then explained, my Government has been concerned with this subject and has been studying it for a long time. It was as a result of that study that I made two proposals: first, that we should request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to set up a study group on the effects of the use of chemical weapons; and second, that we should proceed immediately to consideration of the possibility of a new convention concerning microbiological means of warfare. Our reason for the latter proposal is that we are satisfied, as a result of our studies, that the Committee could proceed with discussion on bacteriological warfare without awaiting a study -- which might be prolonged -- of the technical aspects concerned.

38. I should like to make it clear that we did not put this proposal forward with any idea of suggesting that the Committee's work in this field should be regarded as an alternative to its work on the measures in the nuclear field, to which of course we must give high priority. On the contrary, on behalf of my Government I welcomed the proposal that there should be bilateral negotiations in the very important aspects of the nuclear field between our two co-Chairmen; and, further, I myself made proposals which were later embodied in a working paper (ENDC/232) concerning a possible way out of the impasse that has been reached about a comprehensive test ban.

39. Our proposal that the Committee should devote attention to chemical and biological means of warfare is intended as an addition rather than as an alternative to work in the nuclear field. As I have indicated previously in this Committee, we must be prepared to examine and to work on a number of projects simultaneously with a view to finding those most readily translatable into draft treaties and conventions. I certainly hope that when we resume our work here -- which I trust will be at the earliest possible date -- we can find ways of increasing our productivity in the whole field of disarmament negotiations.

40. I said when introducing our proposal -- and I would repeat this in case there should be any doubt at all -- that my purpose was to supplement and in no sense to supersede the existing 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which my Government, like the Governments of many other representatives who have spoken, attaches very great importance. Our purpose is to go beyond the declaratory character of that Protocol and to prohibit both the possession and the production of these weapons.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

41. I also wish it to be clearly understood that, in proposing that we make a start in the bacteriological or microbiological field, we have in mind only practical considerations. My Government is equally concerned that we should achieve further steps in the chemical warfare field also. In our studies we had of course considered the proposal -- which was first made by the representative of Malta in the First Committee of the General Assembly -- that there should perhaps be a report on both subjects by the Secretary-General, obviously with the aid of appropriate experts and consultants.

42. We included both fields in our studies because they happen to be linked together in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. But it seemed to us that we could proceed to an examination of the microbiological field without awaiting a formal study of the kind now proposed -- and it was on that basis that I submitted our working paper on 6 August. However, since there appears to be a considerable consensus that we should seek expert guidance in both these fields, I should not wish to place any obstacle in the way of our proceeding in that manner. At the same time I must, however, make it clear that I view the request for such studies as an indication of the Committee's intention to proceed in this matter and not as an indication of a desire for procrastination.

43. The suggestion has been made by many delegations here -- initially I think by the representative of Poland -- that we should ask for a study of both aspects: that is to say both chemical and biological. Perhaps it was put more accurately by the representative of India when he suggested two studies, since the nature of the problem would probably involve different sets of experts. In agreeing to those studies, we nevertheless intend to press for consideration of my working paper proposals at the Committee's next session.

44. I should like to thank the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, for the extremely thoughtful and constructive proposals she made in her speech last Tuesday. It seems impossible to speak in these meetings without paying what I am sure we all agree is a well-deserved tribute to Sweden for the prominent part which it plays in our deliberations and for the constructive proposals on a number of subjects which Mrs. Myrdal has contributed over the years. I agree very much with the following observations made by Mrs. Myrdal at our last meeting, on 20 August:

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

"The time element is important. Fortunately the moral barrier, symbolized in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, is very strong against the use of these weapons; but there is an enormous risk of escalation in that field if the barrier is once broken. If we could succeed in prohibiting also production and possession, the barrier would be greatly strengthened."

(ENDC/PV.391, para 39)

45. My entire purpose is to try to strengthen that barrier. I also think that the time element is important. If it is the general wish of the Committee that we should ask for studies of both chemical and biological warfare, I of course would agree. But I should also like it to be recorded in whatever is the appropriate form that it would be the intention of this Committee to return at its next session to the study of the proposals -- which I hope and believe are positive -- in my working paper, a document which sets out the difficulties as well as the nature of the problems.

46. If it can be agreed that we may proceed in that way, perhaps by setting up a working party here to examine the problems -- and particularly the verification problems -- related to this matter, then I should be content with the proposal which has been made by the representatives of Poland, India, Sweden and a number of other countries.

47. Mr. AZEREDO DA SILVEIRA (Brazil): We are now reaching the end of the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, little more than one month after resuming our work. We are also coming to the end of what we knew would be one of the shortest sessions of our Committee. It seems to me to be appropriate to look back at the recent past to see what our achievements have been, if any, and to see what we have been able to do in order to accomplish the tasks entrusted to us by the General Assembly of the United Nations and to meet the present expectations of mankind.

48. I am afraid that, in the eyes of world public opinion, the results which we may be able to present early next week will fall short of what might have been expected of us. Nevertheless, we have something to show, modest as it may be, and that is to a certain extent the programme of work which we will follow in the months, perhaps years, to come.

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, (Brazil))

49. Our meetings in Geneva, this summer, have therefore once again proved to be not completely useless. If we have not been able to achieve more positive results, those who observe the development of our work will undoubtedly recognize that a considerable amount of good will and good faith have been demonstrated in our discussions on finding the most suitable ways to accomplish the basic task of our Committee under United Nations General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), namely the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

50. We have now before us the agenda which was adopted last week (ENDC/PV.390, para 121) and which, in broad outline and in general terms, indicates the different measures on which we are supposed to negotiate in order to reach our final objective.

51. One must recognize, however, that even if such a simple compromise had not been reached by our co-Chairmen, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had already received a very clear mandate from resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second and previous sessions. Besides our basic mandate embodied in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), the Committee also received for consideration the message from President Johnson on 16 July (ENDC/228) and the nine-point memorandum of the Soviet Union (ENDC/227). Those documents have been carefully studied and examined by my Government.

52. My delegation considers, therefore, that resolution 1722 (XVI), together with documents ENDC/228 and ENDC/227, represents the basic terms of reference for the organization of our work. The mandate given by the General Assembly was clear, however, and we were left with no other alternative than to choose the best ways of dealing with the several items for which we are responsible. Some subjects which have not been envisaged by the General Assembly have been included in our agenda (ENDC/PV.390, para. 93) under the headings of "Non-nuclear measures" and "Other collateral measures" because of specific suggestions and proposals put forward by several delegations.

53. At this stage of our work I think it would be appropriate if I put forward some observations my delegation would like to make in connexion with the road to be followed. First of all, I feel obliged to stress -- and this view has already rightly been expressed by the representatives of India, Mr. Husain, and Canada, Mr. Burns -- that

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

we regret not to see a degree of priority assigned to the different subjects within each general heading. We express the hope, however, that when we resume our work we shall be able to consider at the very first meetings a definite and clear-cut order of priority.

54. In order to shed some light on the matter I should like to present briefly the order of priority that seems appropriate to my Government for the best use of the time we have at our disposal and for the more effective accomplishment of our duties. After so many months devoted to the examination of only one matter -- to which the General Assembly had attached the utmost urgency and assigned absolute priority -- we consider that the primary attention of the Committee should be focused upon the negotiation of new collateral measures of nuclear disarmament, particularly those concerned with the halting -- and subsequent reversal of the direction -- of the nuclear arms race. We are pleased to note that our views on this matter coincide with those of the overwhelming majority of members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is therefore with satisfaction that the Brazilian delegation notes the inclusion of that subject in heading 1 of the agenda of the Committee.

55. We must recognize, however, that we do not have an unlimited time in which to arrive at what I think I am right in supposing is our common goal. Time is pressing and running against us, for two-thirds of mankind cannot enjoy the minimum benefits which progress and scientific achievements could provide to them in our time, because of the vast resources which are diverted to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the sophistication of delivery systems. In that connexion we have a particular responsibility to mankind, of which each of us is a part, which expects -- and how much longer it will go on expecting this I am unable to say -- real achievements and positive results. What mankind needs and hopes for is the immediate halting of the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

56. My worries are shared by many other representatives, and I find it appropriate to quote the following warning given by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Castaneda, in his speech of 13 August:

(spoke in Spanish)

"We must realize that the life of the treaty on non-proliferation is precarious. If we do not speedily carry out the two implicit conditions, not only will the treaty live under the threat of a review conference which would examine the progress towards disarmament achieved within the

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

five years since the treaty's entry into force, but the very process of ratification of the treaty could be affected by the results which our Committee achieves on the way in which negotiations on disarmament for the coming years are carried out." (ENDC/PV.389, para.43)

(continued in English)

57. Under the same general heading 1 we also give priority to the cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such a measure would, in our opinion, have a decisive impact on the halting of the nuclear arms race. A number of representatives around this table have maintained -- and I agree with them -- that in the context of an agreement on this subject the difficulty of its verification can no longer be used as an argument, for in respect of inspections the obligations of nuclear-weapon States could be the same as those which non-nuclear countries have recently been asked to undertake.

58. Still on the same general item, we consider also that special attention should be given to agreements which make impossible the sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It is unfortunately now a truism that the existing arsenals in their present degree of sophistication are already sufficient to overkill each and every form of life upon earth.

59. Due to the wisdom of their Governments, the Latin-American countries will never be responsible for a nuclear holocaust; although they are not of course freed from the possibility of such a holocaust, since we have renounced -- I repeat: we have renounced -- nuclear weaponry by an international instrument, the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186). If that region is to be safe, however, it is necessary that the nuclear-weapon Powers, through accession to Additional Protocol II of that Treaty, commit themselves to respect the denuclearized status of Latin America. That was the invitation contained in General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII)(ENDC/210). The United States of America and the United Kingdom have already subscribed to Additional Protocol II; but other States with rather important international responsibilities, such as the USSR, have ignored the appeal of the General Assembly and have not yet signed Additional Protocol II.

60. In the field of nuclear disarmament we now arrive at a subject that, as far as priority is concerned, does not offer any difficulty, since the Committee will limit itself to accomplishing a task already laid down by the General Assembly in resolution 2343 (XXII) (ibid.), which indicates that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should "take up as a matter of urgency" the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

61. Members will recall that in my first statement to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament two years ago (ENDC/PV.276, pp.15 et seq.) I indicated that the Brazilian delegation was convinced we should concentrate our efforts on the question of the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty. That is a question to which importance is attached not only by the great majority of the members of this Committee -- particularly by the delegations of the Group of Eight -- but also by the United Nations General Assembly.

62. May I now turn to the general heading 2, Non-nuclear Measures, among which, in our view, priority should be given to consideration of the question of chemical and bacteriological warfare? In that connexion, the fact that Brazil has not adhered to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 does not mean that we have been engaged at any time in the production or use of that kind of weaponry. At this stage I think it would be appropriate to express my firmest conviction that, if other States can present an equal record, no one -- I repeat, no one -- can exceed Brazil's record in the strictest observance of the objectives and principles of the Geneva Protocol.

63. The Brazilian Government has under study the proposals advanced here in connexion with chemical and bacteriological warfare. The short duration of this session has prevented us from taking a definite position on the matter. Nevertheless we consider that it would be useful if the Secretary-General of the United Nations could report to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the nature and possible effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons and on the implications of their use, along the lines suggested today by the representative of India and, I think, accepted by the representative of the United Kingdom.

64. Finally, under heading 3 I see no other topic for discussion than the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. As has been rightly pointed out, that is a measure of non-armament whose implications should not be minimized.

65. Concerning the organizational aspect of our work, and in connexion with the questions of chemical and bacteriological warfare and the demilitarization of the sea-bed, we support the proposal made by Mr. Castañeda that sub-committees should be created to tackle those questions while the Committee devotes itself to other subjects.

66. I could not conclude my statement without a reference to the agreement reached by the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union to pursue negotiations on the limitation and reduction of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems as well as of systems of defence against ballistic missiles.

(Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil)

My Government realizes the importance of such negotiations in order to halt the nuclear arms race and to attain our goal of disarmament. In that connexion we share the views of other delegations regarding the interest which the Eighteen-Nation Committee has in being informed pari-passu of the development of those bilateral discussions.

67. Those acquainted with the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee are aware of the contributions which my delegation has made, in frankness and good faith, in the field of disarmament. Many of the positions we have been sustaining will undoubtedly be recognized and cherished by future generations. The Brazilian delegation has done its best to accomplish, within our Committee's mandate, the task that other non-nuclear and developing countries expect from us; and we shall continue to do so, in good faith and with an open mind, in order to help the community of nations to find ways of granting safer and better conditions of life to those who will take our place in the years to come.

68. Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): In view of the dramatic situation which is developing in Czechoslovakia, permit me, Mr. Chairman, to acquaint the representatives in this Committee with the short statement made late yesterday evening by the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Ludvig Svoboda, on the Czechoslovak radio:

"Mr dear fellow countrymen, I am speaking to you for the second time on this fateful day. We are living through extraordinarily serious moments in the life of our nation. Armed forces of the Soviet Union, together with troops of the Polish People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and the Bulgarian and Hungarian People's Republics, have entered the territory of the Republic. This has occurred without the consent of the constitutional bodies of the State, which, however, shouldering responsibility for the nationals of our mother country, must speedily seek solutions to the situation and succeed in making foreign troops soon leave this country. In this respect I have exerted such efforts today as I was permitted to by current conditions. Inter alia, I have convened the plenary session of the National Assembly. Tonight I have conferred with members of the Government on some most urgent problems of restoring the normal life of the country and safeguarding its integrity. Talks will continue tomorrow -- and, I trust, with the participation of the Prime Minister, Engineer Oldrich Cernik.

"I am aware of all the problems and difficulties that the current situation has aroused. However, I am making another appeal to you, my dear fellow countrymen, in order to beg you in all urgency to show the utmost sagacity and

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

to avoid anything that might provoke regrettable actions with irreparable consequences. And it is particularly to you young people that I appeal in all sincerity.

"I call on all of you, workers, farmers, intellectuals, to demonstrate by your attitude your relationship to socialism, to freedom and to democracy.

"For us there is no way back. The action programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the programming declaration of the Government of the National Front express the vital interests and requirements of all people of this country; and this is why we must go on in the work we have started.

"We shall not lose hope. We shall close our ranks and, together with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the National Front, we shall pursue in unity our efforts to make better the life of our nation."

69. The statement of the Head of State of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic provides, in my view, the best possible picture of the situation prevailing in my country, and represents the official Czechoslovak position.

70. Mr. AZEREDO DA SILVEIRA (Brazil): I had no intention of raising this point; but I now feel it is my duty to read out to the Committee a declaration made yesterday by President Costa e Silva of Brazil about the sad events in Czechoslovakia:

"The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the occupation of its territory by forces of socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, constitute a serious outrage against the freedom and sovereignty of the Czechoslovak people and flagrantly break the basic rules of behaviour of States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The efforts for the strengthening of international peace and security, which recently have been promising, are thus jeopardized by the disrespect for the fundamental rights of a people.

"The Brazilian Government deplores and condemns such an outrage perpetrated against Czechoslovakia and, inspired by the highest feelings of peace and concord between nations, so cherished by our people, appeals strongly for the cessation of the interventionist activities in that country."

71. The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should now like to make a brief statement in my capacity as representative of the United States.

72. I also had not intended to speak on a matter outside the competence of the Committee; but we cannot pass over in silence the events in Czechoslovakia. I shall therefore read out the statement made yesterday by President Johnson:

"The tragic news from Czechoslovakia shocks the conscience of the world. The Soviet Union and its allies have invaded a defenceless country to stamp out a resurgence of ordinary human freedom.

"It is a sad commentary on the communist mind that a sign of liberty in Czechoslovakia is deemed a fundamental threat to the security of the Soviet system. The excuses offered by the Soviet Union are patently contrived. The Czechoslovakian Government did not request its allies to interfere in its internal affairs. No external aggression threatened Czechoslovakia. The action of the Warsaw Pact allies is in flat violation of the United Nations Charter.

"We are consulting urgently with others to consider what steps should be taken in the United Nations. Ambassador Ball has been instructed to join with others in the Security Council to insist upon the Charter rights of Czechoslovakia and its people.

"Meanwhile, in the name of mankind's hope for peace I call on the Soviet Union and its associates to withdraw their troops from Czechoslovakia. I hope responsible spokesmen for governments and people throughout the world will support this appeal. It is never too late for reason to prevail."

73. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We note with regret that an attempt has been made here to bring into our discussion an extraneous element which has no relation whatsoever to the discussion of the problems before the Committee. Unfounded and slanderous statements have been made here about the Soviet Union, which we entirely reject..

74. On 21 August the following statement was made in Moscow by the Soviet Union:

"Tass is authorized to state that party and government leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have asked the Soviet Union and other allied States to render the fraternal Czechoslovak people urgent assistance, including assistance with armed forces. This request was brought about by the threat which has arisen to the socialist regime existing in Czechoslovakia,

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

and to the State system established by the Constitution, the threat emanating from the counter-revolutionary forces which have entered into collusion with foreign forces hostile to socialism.

"The events in Czechoslovakia and around her were on several occasions the subject of exchanges of views between the leaders of fraternal socialist countries, including the leaders of Czechoslovakia. These countries are unanimous in the view that the support, consolidation and defence of the peoples' socialist gains is a common internationalist duty of all the socialist States. This common stand by them was solemnly proclaimed in the Bratislava statement.

"The further aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia affects the vital interests of the Soviet Union and other socialist States, the interests of the security of the States of the socialist community. The threat to the socialist regime in Czechoslovakia constitutes at the same time a threat to the mainstays of European peace.

"The Soviet Government and the Governments of the allied countries -- the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic -- basing themselves on the principles of indissoluble friendship and co-operation in accordance with existing treaty obligations, have decided to meet the above-mentioned request to render necessary help to the fraternal Czechoslovak people.

"This decision is fully in accord with the right of States to individual and collective self-defence as provided for in the treaties of alliance concluded between the fraternal socialist countries. This decision is also in keeping with vital interests of our countries in safeguarding European peace against the forces of militarism, aggression and revanchism which have more than once plunged the peoples of Europe into wars.

"Soviet armed units together with armed units of the above-mentioned allied countries entered the territory of Czechoslovakia on 21 August. They will be immediately withdrawn from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as soon as the threat to the gains of socialism in

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Czechoslovakia, the threat to the security of the countries of the socialist community, is eliminated and the lawful authorities consider that the further presence of these armed units there is no longer necessary.

"The actions which are being taken are not directed against any State, nor do they in any way infringe the State interests of anyone. They serve the purpose of peace and have been dictated by concern for its consolidation.

"The fraternal countries firmly and resolutely counterpose their unbreakable solidarity to any threat from outside. Nobody will ever be allowed to wrest a single link from the community of socialist States."

75. Mr. CARACCIOLI (Italy) (translation from French): I, too, did not intend to speak on this subject, but I should now like to read out a statement made in Rome by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy which I believe has a direct relation to our work:

"The events in Czechoslovakia and the form in which they have occurred compel us, at least for the moment, to pause for reflection before signing the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

76. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): As this matter has been raised, I should like to place on record the statement which was issued by my Government yesterday:

"Her Majesty's Government regard the action taken by the Soviet Government and certain of her allies in invading Czechoslovakia as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and all accepted standards of international behaviour. The action is also in sharp conflict with the often-repeated statements by the Soviet Government about non-interference with the sovereign rights of independent States.

"This is a tragedy not only for Czechoslovakia but for Europe and the whole world. It is a serious blow to the efforts which so many countries have been making to improve relations between East and West.

"In the light of these grave events we are naturally in close consultation with our friends."

77. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): The Polish delegation regrets the introduction of extraneous matters into this Committee. The question that has been raised by some representatives is not relevant to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Committee is not competent to discuss it.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

78. I would add that those who attempt to lecture to and judge others should first try to clear their own consciences.

79. In the debates which have been held so far we have avoided the discussion of highly controversial political issues. We have achieved some positive results in the Committee's work which create a good basis for further progress in the future. Therefore we should avoid doing anything which might jeopardize those prospects.

80. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): It is almost embarrassing to recall that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has a well-defined task, and we all know how difficult that task is. Our debate needs above all that atmosphere of calmness which, to everyone's satisfaction, was established here, I believe, during the recent sessions of the Committee and which contributed, we are convinced, to the good work that was done. That is why I think that certain statements which we have just heard here concerning the events in Czechoslovakia call for a reply.

81. It has been clearly established by the statement read out by the representative of the Soviet Union that the measures which have been taken were rendered necessary by a threat which was constantly increasing and which was endangering the socialist regime of the country and the vital interests of all the other countries of the socialist community, as well as security and peace in Europe and in the world.

82. The measures in question were taken within the framework of the obligations and the very close links which bind the socialist countries and peoples to each other, by virtue of the international duty of every socialist country to come to the assistance of another country in order to defend the conquests of socialism. To speak of these events in the terms used in certain statements made here does not correspond with reality and is an attempt to distort the truth -- an attempt that has nothing to do with the interests of Czechoslovakia or of peace.

83. Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): I should like to answer the statements just made in this Committee by saying that to my mind the statement which was made by the Head of State, the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and which I have read out to the Committee is the best reply to their interventions. I have nothing to add to it.

84. The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Since there are no other speakers, I shall now read out the proposed communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 392nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador George Bunn, representative of the United States.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, the United States, the USSR, Poland and Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 27 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

85. Are there any comments on or corrections to the communique?

86. Mr. AZEREDO DA SILVEIRA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I should like you to add the name of Brazil after that of Czechoslovakia. I think you forgot to include the name of Brazil when you read out the communique. I was the first speaker after the representative of Czechoslovakia.

87. The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Is there any objection to that request by the representative of Brazil? I am advised by Mr. Protitch that the custom is to mention the name of a country in the communique only once.

88. Mr. AZEREDO DA SILVEIRA (Brazil): If that is the custom, then that is all right.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 392nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador George Bunn, representative of the United States.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, the United States, the USSR, Poland and Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 27 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.





